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The last decade has witnessed a world trend of fiscal decentralization in the developing 
countries as an escape from inadequate growth and inefficient governance. With respect to 
China, fiscal decentralization has been a fundamental aspect of its transition to a market 
economy; and the country has made substantial efforts to break down its highly centralized 
fiscal management system with various forms of fiscal contracting systems (1978-1993) 
and later a tax sharing system (1994-present).  
Although China remains a unitary 
political system, the current structure of 
governance gives strong feel of a fiscal 
federalism: local governments in China are 
organized in a four-level hierarchical way 
with each level of government reporting to 
the next highest level (see Chart 1), and 
they have been given considerable latitude 
in shaping local policies and managing 
fiscal resources. About 70 percent of the entire public expenditure was made at the sub-
national levels and over 55 percent at sub-provincial levels in 2004 (Qiu 2005).  
  However, China is much less decentralized than what appears on the surface. The 
center exerts substantial control over localities through the intergovernmental fiscal system, 
several binding expenditure laws, and numerous expenditure mandates as well as its 
authoritarian political arrangement. Sub-national governments are largely dependent on 
shares of central taxes and grants after the 1994 reform. In 2003, they financed 67 percent 
of provincial, 57 percent of prefecture and 66 percent of county and lower level 
expenditures (Qiao and Shah 2006). The local fiscal dependence, combined with a 
hierarchical party structure and the absence of national elections, emboldens predatory 
behavior of the upper-level governments and hence confines the full benefits of fiscal 
decentralization.  
  It is widely believed that decentralization in China has contributed to the country’s 
remarkable economic performance over the last 25 years (Jin, et al. 2005;Jin and Zou 
2003;Lin and Liu 2000;Qian 1999) whereas the issue is still open to debate. Fiscal 
Chart 1   China: Structure of Government (2004) 
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decentralization has also brought many unintended problems, including increasing regional 
disparities, proliferation of off-budgetary funds, deficient and unequal public services 
delivery, farmers’ financial burden and rural unrest.  
  The objectives of this paper are to review the experience of China’s fiscal 
decentralization, explore the impact of fiscal decentralization on growth and public 
expenditures, and identify political as well as economic issues arising after 1994 tax 
sharing reform in the last decade.  
After some background discussions, this paper is divided into six main parts: 
section 2 briefly summaries the process of China’s fiscal decentralization; section 3 
examines the expenditure and revenue assignments as well as the intergovernmental 
transfer system; section 4 addresses various issues related to local government financing, 
including local taxes, intergovernmental transfers, and local borrowing; section 5 assesses 
the shifting of fiscal power between the central government and local governments through 
decentralization; section 6 analyzes the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth; section 7  highlights political and economic issues induced by the fiscal 
decentralization reforms; and the paper concludes with potential policy options.  
 
1. Economic and Political Background of the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform 
 
The rigid centralization of planning, finance, and administration, adopted from the Soviet 
Union, dominated the first 30 years of the People's Republic (1949-79). However, the 
central planning system did not thrive in the pre-industrial, agrarian, and under-developed 
conditions of China. At the dawn of the reform period in the late 1970s, the centralized 
system was already decimated: provincial and local governments ran most enterprises and 
took responsible for planning and economic administration within their jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, the fiscal system was still highly centralized: the consolidated budget system 
forbid the discretionary spending power of the local governments; revenues, largely from 
the profit remittances of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), were collected by local 
governments and accrued to the center (Riskin 2000;Wong 2000;Wong, et al. 1995).  
As China’s leaders set their sights on a market economy beginning in 1979, the 
mechanisms of the planned economy, including the monopoly state ownership of industry,    
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administrative prices, and the central economic planning, were dismantled and accordingly 
the fiscal system broke down quickly. While some scholars (Lin and Liu 2000) reckon 
these changes as a more or less carefully thought out response to China's changing needs, 
many scholars believe that the evolution of China’s fiscal decentralization has been an ad 
hoc and uncoordinated process; it was mainly driven by the collapse of the old fiscal 
system as the central government trying to tackle dysfunctional behavior under the 
pressure induced by reforms (Wong 2000). This breakdown was inevitable with the 
erosion of the SOE profits - the foundation of the previous fiscal system – in the face of 
burgeoning non-state sector, growing competition imposed on SOEs, and rising wages and 
resource prices. Furthermore, tax administration was enormously challenged by the rapidly 
changing conditions and the proliferation of enterprises of various ownership forms. The 
government revenue collection plummeted from 35 percent of GDP in the late 1970s to 
just 12.6 percent in 1993. The devolution of fiscal responsibilities to lower levels appeared 
prevalent in coping with mounting fiscal stress. The center, increasingly revenue-
dependent on local governments, was left no choice but negotiate with localities for its 
own share. The fiscal system was on the verge of crash, and a number of different revenue 
sharing systems were tried out during the 1980s.  
Despite the persistent efforts to revamp the malfunctioning fiscal system, the late 
80s and early 90s were marked by a continuing decline of the “two ratios” (budgetary 
revenue to GDP and central to total budgetary revenue), interference of local governments 
in the private sector, increasing regional fiscal disparities, devolution of expenditure 
responsibilities accompanied by diversion of resources away from formal budget into 
extra-budgetary channels, and ongoing distrust between center and localities.  
 
Fiscal Decline 
   This 1988 fiscal contracting system further dampened fiscal power at the center. 
Since the revenue assignment was not clear, local governments continued to appropriate 
central revenues. The center relied on local tax collection, which was highly subject to 
local authorities who frequently granted tax exemptions without proper central 
authorization. The local abuse of tax power intrigued a vicious cycle of jurisdictional 
competition. The central government’s shared of revenue fell from 33 percent in 1988 to    
 
  5
only 22 percent in percent in 1993 (Chart 2). On the other side, local governments 
increased their revenue share, particularly those that were major contributors to the central 
government’s revenue. In practice, the contracts were not strictly adhered to and were 
revised repeatedly for some regions.  
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2004 
 
Distortion in the Private Sector 
The fiscal contracting system of the 1980s, aligning tax revenues in accordance 
with the ownership of SOEs, induced a number of problems: First, the system paralleled 
the interests of the government in line with those of enterprises, which not only encouraged 
various levels of governments to interfere in the operation of the enterprises and hence 
hindered the process of separating governments from enterprises (Zhengqi Fenli), but also 
did harm to the market economy by rendering the special treatment to SOEs and 
destructing fair competition. Second, the system provided local governments with 
incentives to pursue their own fine fiscal interests in enlarging tax bases by the expansion 
of local enterprises such as distilleries and cigarette factories, which also generated 
overlapping construction and development and inspired local protectionism. 
 
Increasing Fiscal Disparities    
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The system also contributed to greater regional fiscal disparities. With a great 
variety of fiscal contracts in use, the system was a chief result of political negotiation 
between the central and individual province; it worked in a way detrimental to the poor 
regions. Rich provinces in the East like Canton, Shanghai, and Shandong, were able to 
have more advantageous contracts because of the development strategies and their political 
leverage.  
 
Devolution of Fiscal Responsibilities and Growing Distrust between Center and Local 
On one hand, fiscal stress at the center forced Beijing to cut intergovernmental 
transfers and meanwhile shed more spending responsibilities to the lower levels of 
government. On the other hand, local expenditure grew much faster than central 
expenditures, especially unemployment insurance, pension funds, and housing subsidies. 
The share of local expenditure rose from 45 percent of the total in 1981 to about 72 percent 
in 1993. The role of local governments shifted from simply providing services to acting as 
both financier and provider.  
A climate of distrust surrounded intergovernmental fiscal relations in the early 
1990s. The central government recognized the continuing fiscal decline partly due to local 
government unwillingness to collect taxes while diverting funds from budgetary to extra-
budgetary channels. From the local perspective, the repeated changes in revenue sharing 
rules were viewed as a sign of lacking firm commitment at the center to build solid local 
finance. Moreover, during the 1980s, on several occasions the central government revised 
the ownership of key sectors and introduced new levies to increase its share of revenues, 
e.g. the Energy and Transport Key Construction Fund and the Budget Adjustment Fund. 
The central government also “borrowed” revenue from local governments as a way to 
absorb some excessive local revenues. The manipulative actions by the center convinced 
local governments that surplus revenues were not safe from the center’s predatory behavior, 
and thus significant amount of revenues was switched subtly into myriad extra-budgetary 
funds (Ahmad 2002;Wong, et al. 1995). 
 
When the 1988–90 system was supposed to expire in 1991, Beijing failed to pursue 
alternative approaches; the contracting system was extended until the end of 1993. A    
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radical reform of the fiscal system was finally cooked out in 1994 at the climax of the 
fiscal struggle. 
 
2. History of Fiscal Decentralization in China 
 
China has made substantial efforts to decentralize its fiscal management system. The  
1980s’ and early 1990s’ reforms were aimed at promoting local economic development 
through increasing local governments’ responsibilities and their autonomy in carrying out 
fiscal functions, while preserving an adequate degree of fiscal control for the central 
government. The strategy did boost local growth in many regions, but it also brought many 
unintended problems including declining general government revenues, waning fiscal 
position of the overall government, weakening macroeconomic management, and rising 
regional disparities. At the culmination of the struggle, the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform was 
initiated as the first attempt to fix the intergovernmental fiscal system as the main purpose. 
However, the grand undertaking was undermined by preserving many features of the pre-
reform arrangements: a lump-sum transfer, or tax rebate, was established to guarantee the 
coastal provinces’ pre-1994 income level, and it remains a dominant plank of the total 
central transfers until today; the vague responsibilities assignment between levels of 
governments was left unaddressed, which is indeed a principal cause of starved local 
finance and the enduring quandary of extra- and off – budget revenues; and furthermore, 
the equalization transfer has remained small after a decade of implementation which 
further deteriorates the relations between central and local governments.  
 
1) 1949-1978 Pre-Reform Fiscal System – Central Control System 
The fiscal system installed by the new regime in the 1950s largely ensembles the Soviet 
practice. Over the period 1949-79, China government made several attempts to overcome 
the rigid centralization of planning, finance, and administration. At the inception of the 
reform period in the late 1970s, China was already characterized by many features of fiscal 
federalism: provincial and local governments ran most enterprises and were responsible for 
planning and economic administration within their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, Beijing 
determines every aspect of the fiscal system. It is a simple and effective system under pre-   
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reform conditions, but one completely lacking in fiscal incentives for local governments or 




The tax system was crude with only few tax types even absent of income and 
corporate taxes. Revenues were largely raised from the profit remittances from, and taxes 
on, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose profitability was ensured by the structure of 
state-fixed prices. At the end of the 1970s, profits from SOEs accounted for nearly half of 
total government revenues. Although the provinces participated in raising revenues, their 
expenditures were budgeted by the center. 
Tax administration was simple since there were relatively few taxpayers – mainly 
SOEs. Tax collection was delegated to local governments. The accounts of SOEs were 
easy to monitor: given fixed prices, planned output and sales, tax capacity and tax effort 
were easy to determine. Taxes and profits, collected locally, were transferred back to the 
local governments according to the local spending needs approved by the center (Wong 
2000).  
 
Expenditure and Budget  
Expenditures were essentially all determined at the center. Under the consolidated 
budget system, the central government set spending priorities, approved local budgets, and 
determined civil service salary scale, pension and unemployment benefits, educational and 
health care standards, etc.; sub-national governments, in the absence of independent 
budgets, lacked discretionary spending power. Local governments, as budgetary units 
identical to SOEs, were agents of the central government.  
With respect to expenditure assignment, the central government was responsible for 
national defense, economic development (capital spending, R&D, universities and research 
institutes), industrial policy, and administration of national institutions such as the judicial 
system. Local governments were in charge of delivering day-to-day public administration 
and social services such as primary and secondary education, public safety, health care, 




The Intergovernmental Transfer System: Fiscal Gap Transfers 
Since local finance came from the central budget, intergovernmental transfers were 
set to finance the gap between locally collected revenues and permitted local expenditures. 
In other words, local income in excess of expenses, was to be transferred to the central 
government and shortfalls were to be covered automatically. This revenue sharing system 
was highly redistributive: for example, while Shanghai gave up 80-90 percent of its 
collected revenues, Guizhou was able to finance more than two-thirds of its expenditures 
from central subsidies (Wong 2000). Such a system was highly devoted to the equalization 
concerns. 
 
2) 1979 – 1993 Ad Hoc Decentralization -- Fiscal Contract System 
The prominent features of the period 1979-1993 comprised a significant reduction in fiscal 
revenue collection as a percentage of GDP and a conspicuous falling trend of central 
revenues. As the tax effort at the local level could no longer be monitored, the central 
government was forced to negotiate with increasingly disobedient local governments on 
revenue shares. From 1980, three different revenue sharing systems were introduced and 
abandoned as they all failed to reverse the trend of falling fiscal revenues, but induced 
undesired malpractices one after another. On the positive side, fiscal reforms during this 
period provided the device to mobilize local revenue collection in an effort to promote 
local economic development. 
 
1980 Contract Responsibility System 
A fiscal revenue sharing system replaced the highly centralized system in 1980. 
From then on, the central and provincial governments each began to ‘eat in separate 
kitchens’, which provided sub-national governments with an incentive to collect revenue. 
Under that system, central-provincial sharing rules were established by the central 
government; provincial-municipal relations were governed by the province; and this 
principal extended to lower levels. There were three basic types of revenues under the 
reformed system: central-fixed revenues, local-fixed revenues, and shared revenues. 
During the period 1980–84, about 80% of the shared revenues were remitted to the central    
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government and 20% were retained by local governments. The bases and rates of all the 
taxes, whether shared or fixed, were determined by the central government. Enterprises 
were supposed to pay taxes to the level of government they subordinate to. Almost all 
revenues, except a few minor central-fixed revenues, were collected by the local finance 
bureaus. 
 
1985 Modified Contract Responsibility System 
The uniform-sharing formula during the period 1980-1984 created undesired 
surpluses in affluent provinces and deficits in poor provinces although the reform boosted 
more revenue collection in many localities. In 1985, the State Council redesigned revenue-
sharing arrangements by varying schedules based on localities’ budget balances in the 
previous years. The financially weak provinces were allowed to retain more revenues, but 
the wealthier regions, like Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, 
were penalized by remitting more revenues to the center. As a consequence, the revenues 
from these regions generally grew more slowly than the national average since the high 
level of remittance curbed local enthusiasm for expanding their tax bases.  
 
1988 Fiscal Contracting System 
In the period 1988 – 1993, the government implemented a “fiscal contracting 
system” that introduced six types of central-provincial revenue-sharing methods, each 
applied to some provinces (Agarwala 1992). 
 
Table 1   1988 Fiscal Contracting Methods 
1. contracted sharing rate with fixed yearly growth rate of revenue 
The central-local revenue sharing rate and the yearly growth rate of local revenues were based on the revenue performance of the 
province over recent years and negotiated by the central and provincial governments. If the real growth rate was greater than the 
contracted rate, the province could keep all the surpluses. If the real growth rate was lower than the contracted rate, then the province 
had to make up the gap.  
 
Central gov’t shared revenue in the province = revenue in the province in previous year * (1 + contracted yearly growth rate of the 
province) * contracted central shared ratio 
2. fixed local shared rate in total revenue 
The sharing rate was determined on the basis of a base amount for total expenditure and a base amount for total revenue. In other 
words, the province shares the revenue growth according to the same ratio.  
 
Local gov’t shared ratio of total revenue in the province = base amount for expenditure in province / base amount for total revenue in 
province 
3. fixed local shared rate in total revenue + incremental fixed shared rate 
Besides sharing total revenue on the basis of a fixed shared ratio, the province could share the revenue growth at a different sharing 
ratio.  
4. contracted remittance with fixed annual growth rate  
The province remits to the central gov’t a fixed amount per year plus a variable amount determined by a fixed yearly growth rate    
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contracted by the center and the province.  
5. fixed contracted remittance 
The province remitted to the central gov’t a fixed amount every year which equal to the revenue surplus in the base year: 
 
Fixed contracted remittance in province = base amount for revenue – base amount for expenditure 
6. fixed contracted grants 
For all provinces whose base amount for expenditure was larger than the base amount for revenue, they keep all the base revenue and 
in addition get a fixed contracted grant from the central gov’t every year which was theoretically equal to the fiscal gap in the base 
year.  
 
The Intergovernmental Transfer System: Mixed Gap-Filling Transfer System 
During this period, the transfer system was still dominantly gap-filling transfer: 
when the base amount for expenditures was larger than the fixed local revenues, the 
province was allowed to keep all the fixed revenue and in addition, entitled to shared-
revenues which filled the fiscal gap; when the base amount of expenditure in a province 
was less than its base amount of local fixed revenue, the province had to remit the surplus 
to the central government, and when the base amount for expenditure in the province was 
greater than both the base amounts for its fixed revenue and shared revenues, then the 
province can keep both and in addition, the fiscal gap was filled with the “fixed amount” 
grants from the central government every year (Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez 2003). The 
system of intergovernmental transfers in China consisted of four kinds of central-local 
grants. Under the fiscal contract system, some provinces had to remit to the central 
government part of their revenues, according to a predetermined lump-sum amount or a 
progressively increasing ratio of revenues. The central government depended a great deal 
on this local transfer from the better-off provinces during that period.  
 
a. Fixed Subsidy: This transfer was aimed at redistributing revenues and expenditures to 
maintain local fiscal balance. Subsidies were given to provinces with base-year 
expenditures large than base-year revenues. 
b. Special-Purpose Grant: The transfer was initially used for disaster relief, poverty 
reduction, and other specific purposes, it was expanding in terms of both the range of the 
programs and the size of the financial resources.  
c. Annual Accounting Closing Transfers: The amount of this transfer was determined at 
the end of each fiscal year. It acted as an adjustment to the net revenues and expenditures, 
taking into account transfers between central and local governments.    
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d. Capital Grants: The central government also disbursed conditional grants mainly for 
local capital construction and other investment activities.  
 
3) 1994 – present: Tax Sharing Reform 
The fiscal reform of 1994 was a real attempt to deal with the basic revenue problems by 
curbing the fiscal decline and providing sufficient resources especially to the central 
government, simplifying the tax structure and enhancing its transparency, and improving 
central-local revenue sharing arrangements.  
The centerpiece of the reform was the introduction of the Tax Assignment System 
(fenshuizhi), which specifies the way revenues are shared between the central and 
provincial governments. The detailed analysis of the tax assignment system is provided in 
the next section. The tax structure was greatly simplified. The Value-Added Tax (VAT) 
replaced the turnover-based product tax, and has been implemented basically at a uniform 
rate of 17 percent. The corporate income tax was unified to include all domestic enterprises, 
and the top rate has been reduced from 55 percent to 33 percent. The consumption taxes on 
tobacco, liquor, and other luxuries were introduced. The previous system of profit and tax 
contracts, under which SOEs negotiated annual transfers to the government budget, was 
largely eliminated (Ahmad 2002;Wong 2000). 
Along with the changes in the division of revenue sources, a major effort was made 
by the central government to establish its own revenue collection bodies which in effect 
centralized the revenue system for the first time since the economic reform started in 1978. 
In 1994 and 1995, National Tax Services (NTSs) were established in all provinces to 
collect central-fixed revenues and shared revenues. These NTSs are organized on the basis 
of the divisions in charge of central-fixed and shared taxes under the old tax bureaus. The 
former divisions in charge of local taxes became Local Tax Services (LTSs). The State 
Bureau of General Taxation, the central headquarters of the NTSs, was empowered to 
supervise local NTSs, appoint their directors and provide funding for their operations. 
The 1994 reform achieved some notable successes:  
Improving the “two ratios”: The immediate impact of the tax-assignment system 
on the division of revenue sources between the central and local governments was very 
significant, which finally ended the situation that the central government relied on local    
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remittances to finance its outlays. As shown in the Chart 3, the ratio of the central 
government’s revenue to the total jumped from 22 percent in 1993 to about 56 percent in 
1994. Although the ratio came down slightly after 1994, the average was above 50 percent, 
compared to no more than 40 percent for 15 years since 1978. On of the prominent 
changes in the tax system accredited for the increase in the share of central government 
revenue is the center now controls VAT collection. In 1994, VAT alone accounted for 
about 42% of total government revenue (Ma 1997a). The creation of the NTS has also 
certainly made a difference. The decline in the revenue-to-GDP ratio was also finally 
halted in 1996 after seventeen-year decline. The fiscal revenue accounted for 17.8 percent 
of GDP in 2002. It is important to mention that GDP was increasing remarkably during the 
period. 
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Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
Simplifying the Intergovernmental Finance System: The 1994 Tax Assignment 
System replaced the previous six types of fiscal contract system, which makes the system 
much easier to manage. The clearer and proper assignment of taxes not only put a stop to 
the enduring misappropriation of revenues between central and local governments, but also 
provided right incentives to sub-national governments. For instance, since excise taxes are 
assigned to the central government and business taxes to local governments, the incentives 
for localities to over-develop enterprises with higher tax returns, such as distilleries and 
tobacco companies, are corrected (Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez 2003).    
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Tightening Fiscal Control: The establishment of NTSs offered a better control 
over general tax collection and local tax exemption policies. The interference of local 
authorities in tax administration and collection of central and shared revenues are 
substantially restrained. The 1994 reform abolished all tax reduction and exemptions 
granted by provincial governments for the turnover tax in the past. The new tax 
exemptions have to be approved by the center and reported in a separate schedule of the 
tax return.  
 
3. Expenditure and Revenue Assignment as well as Intergovernmental 
Transfer System  
 
1) Revenue Assignment 
The tax sharing reform in 1994 explicitly defined fiscal revenue as the central revenue, 
shared revenue and the local revenue. Taxes that can be used in the pursuit of maintaining 
national objectives were assigned as central taxes; the taxes that could be interpreted as 
more relevant to economic development were assigned as shared taxes; and the taxes more 
suitable to be collected and administered by the local governments were assigned as local 
taxes. Table 2 reflects the current tax assignment system. The central government changed 
the revenue sharing arrangement between the central and sub-national governments little 
by little after the 1994 reform. First, from May 1997, the sharing ratio of Stamp Taxes on 
Security Exchange between the central and local governments was adjusted from 50%-
50% to 88%-12%; from 1st Oct 2000, it was changed to 97%- 3% in subsequent three 
years. Second, the business tax rate on the financial and insurance industry increased from 
5% to 8%, and the central government gets all the extra revenues. Third, since January 1, 
2002, the central and local governments share all the company income tax revenues, except 
a list of enterprises, and personal income tax revenues together at the ratio of 50%-50% in 
2002. In 2003 and 2004, the central government’s sharing rate went up to 60% (Su 
2003;Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez 2003). In 2004, the fiscal revenue of the central 
government is RMB150.10 billions, counting for 57% of total fiscal revenue which is 
RMB 263.96 billions, while the fiscal revenue of the local governments is RMB110 
billions in total, or 43% of the total fiscal revenue.     
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Financial pressures on local governments have intensified since the introduction of 
the Tax Sharing System in 1994, which re-centralized revenues without cutting 
expenditure assignments to localities. At the sub-national level, the centralizing trend 
occurs at each level at the expense of the subordinate governments. The taxes assigned at 
the present time exclusively to the local level in general do not provide an adequate 
revenue base for local governments.  
 
Table 2 Revenue Shares of Various Orders of Government, 2004 
Taxes Central  Provincial 
Tariffs 100%  - 
Excise Tax  100%  - 
Vehicle Purchasing Tax  100%  - 
VAT and Excise Tax on Imported Goods  100%  - 
VAT  73%  27% 
Business Tax  3%  97% 
Stamp Tax on Security Transactions  97%  3% 
Individual Income Tax  60%  40% 
Enterprise Income Tax  60%  40% 
Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax  1%  99% 
Urban and Township Land Use Tax  -  100% 
Housing Property Tax  -  100% 
Vehicle and Vessel Use Tax  -  100% 
Land Appreciation Tax  -  100% 
Stamp Tax  -  100% 
Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Tax  -  100% 
Tax on Special Products  -  100% 
Contract Tax  -  100% 
Farmland Occupation Tax  -  100% 
Gift and Bequest Tax  -  100% 
Slaughter and Banquet Tax  -  100% 
Fixed Asset Investment Tax  -  100% 
Resource Tax  -  100%   
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005. 
 
Table 3 provides an overview of central and local taxes during the period 1996-
2003. Local governments rely most on Business Tax, VAT, and Enterprise Income Tax 
(276.76, 181.01, 117.89 billion yuan respectively in 2003), amounting to about 70 percent 
of the local total. As for the central government, VAT, Taxes on Imports, Enterprise 
Income Tax, and Consumption Tax are the key resources with the total of 1113.72 billion 
yuan in 2003, accounting almost 96 percent of the total central revenues.  
 
 
Table 3  Central and Local Taxes, 1996-2003 
Unit: billion yuan 
Taxes    1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003 
Excise Tax    62.02 67.87 81.49 82.07 85.83 93.00 104.63 118.23 




Tariffs    30.18 31.95 31.30 56.22 75.05 84.05  70.43  92.31 
Cargo Tax           0.62  0.85  0.94 
Vehicle Purchase Tax           26.58  34.88  46.82 
Tax Rebate for Foreign Trade 




108.00 -115.00 -198.86 
Other Central Taxes    2.29 2.82 4.24 4.30 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
              
VAT  Central  222.00 245.96 272.00 290.76 341.32 401.55  463.10  542.56 
  Local 74.28  82.43  90.84  97.43  114.00  134.17  154.74  181.10 
Business Tax  Central  4.63 16.33 23.46 21.49 24.31 21.50  15.53  7.69 
  Local  100.63 116.10 134.05 145.37 162.57 184.91  229.50  276.76 
Enterprise Income Tax  Central  56.56 42.47 39.69 59.17 61.02 94.53 188.22 174.07 
  Local 40.28  53.84  52.86  62.44  105.18  168.56  120.06  117.88 
Personal Income Tax  Central       0.08  14.95  27.92  60.60  85.08 
  Local       41.28 51.02 71.60  60.58  56.73 
Stamp Tax on Security 
Exchange  Central  6.08 20.22 18.03 21.53 42.29 26.59  10.86  12.39 
  Local  6.08 3.51 2.46 6.71 5.47 1.70  0.34  0.38 
Urban Maintenance and 
Construction Tax  Central  0.31 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.33 0.36  0.37  0.33 
  Local  24.19 26.87 29.20 31.26 34.90 38.06  46.71  54.67 
              
Tax on Resources    5.73 5.65 6.19 6.29 6.36 6.71  7.51  8.33 
Urban Land Using Tax    3.93 4.41 5.41 5.91 6.48 6.62  7.68  9.16 
Agricultural Tax    33.83 36.50 36.54 39.05 29.89 28.63  42.14  42.38 
Fixed Assets Investment Adjustment 
Tax  6.22 7.84  10.76  13.01 4.63 1.56  0.80   
Tax on the Use of 
Cultivated Land    3.12 3.25 3.34 3.30 3.53 3.83  5.73  9.00 
Other Local Taxes    46.60 59.81 72.20 41.45 44.87 49.94  64.82  84.95 
              
Central Total    346.08 423.20 482.44 574.77 689.27 833.86 1023.03 1160.40 
Local Total    344.90 400.20 443.85 493.49 568.89 696.28  740.62  841.33   
Source: Finance Yearbook of China (2004). 
 
 
2) Expenditure Assignment 
The 1994 reform did not change the responsibility assignments that existed by law and 
practice before 1994. The extent system, as set out in the constitution, is broadly consistent 
with international practices: the central government is responsible for nation-wide services 
including national defense, foreign affairs, the operation of the central government body, 
the macro-economic control and coordination of economic development, and providing 
funds for universities, hospitals, research institutions, newspapers, publishing houses, etc 
that directly under the control of the central government; the sub-national governments are 
responsible for delivering most public goods and services, the development of the local    
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economy, and operation of various institutions. Table 4 illustrates the current responsibility 
assignments in China. Ma and Norregaard (1998) suggest that the expenditure assignment 
is largely a result of the division of budgetary agencies’ affiliations. The central budget is 
responsible for state-owned enterprises, universities, hospitals, and research institutions; 
expenditures of budgetary agencies “owned” by local governments, including primary and 
secondary schools, most hospitals, local infrastructure facilities, pension funds, and various 
extra-budgetary funds, are the responsibilities of local budgets (Ma and Norregaard 1998, 
2).  
 
Table 4  Fiscal Decentralization: Responsibility Assignment by Administrative Levels 
Public Services  Central  Provincial  Local 
National Defense  *     
Foreign Affairs  *     
Administration of the Central Gov’t  *     
Administration of the Sub-national Governments    *  * 
Geological Prospecting Expenses  *     
Macro-economic control and regional coordination of economic 
development 
*    
Public Debt  *     
R&D  * * * 
Capital  Investment  * * * 
Running Costs of the Military Police  *  *  * 
Agricultural  Support  * * * 
Law and Order  *  *  * 
Culture  * * * 
Education  * * * 
Health  * * * 
Social  Security  * * * 
Price  Subsidies  * * * 
Urban Maintenance and Construction    *  * 
Militia   *  *   
Sources: Su 2003 and Zhang 2003. 
 
There is substantial overlapping between the center's and the local governments' 
responsibilities in heavy industrial sectors (e.g. electricity and raw materials), large 
infrastructure projects, higher education, R&D, and social safety nets, which complicates 
both the revenue assignments and the needed design of the transfer system. Further, 
unfunded central mandates have overloaded localities. For instance, since 1980 the central 
government has increased the standards of rural basic education on paper, but no new 
resources have been assigned to townships and counties to provide these services. 
Table 5   Public Expenditure by Function and 
Levels of Government, 2004 
Function Central  Provincial 
Sub-
Provincial    
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China’s local governments 
(provincial, prefecture, county, and 
township) have a much larger portion of 
expenditure responsibilities that are out of 
line with international practice. Local 
governments play the key role in 
providing social services such as 
education, health care, social security, housing and urban/local services. According to 
Table 5, sub-provincial governments covered 75 percent of education expenditure, 70 
percent of health, and 70 percent of various social services. Some assignments seem to be 
wrong – for example, assigning local governments major redistributive activities as social 
security, unemployment insurance, and basic social welfare which should be reassigned to 
the national or provincial levels in order to reap the benefits of risk pooling and 
equalization; and assigning local governments the core services of primary education and 
public health which are usually the sharing responsibilities between national and provincial 
governments. 
With no specific central government guidelines, the actual division of expenditure 
responsibilities among sub-provincial governments is left to the discretion of each level of 
government. The higher-level government has discretion to determine the expenditure 
assignment of the level immediately below it. In other words, provinces determine the 
assignments of cities/prefectures, and the cities determine the assignments of counties and 
the latter determine the revenues and expenditures of townships. The outcome is quite 
regressive, leaving the lowest level of government financially starved. County and 
township levels of government spend 70 percent of budgetary expenditures for education, 
and 55-60 percent of those for health. Cities at the prefecture and county levels account for 
all expenditures on unemployment insurance, social security, and welfare (World Bank. 
2002).  
Table 6 compares budgetary expenditure between central and local governments in 
2003. The central government poured most of its financial resources to national defense, 
capital construction, and debt services, which are respectively 188.53, 152.28, and 95.52 
billion yuan. Sub-national governments spent about a quarter of the budget on operating 
Defense 99%     
Law and Order  5%  30%  65% 
Debt Servicing  99%  1%   
Economic Services  40%  20%  40% 
General Administration  20%  40%  40% 
Subsidies 15%  25%  60% 
Social Services  10%  20%  70% 
Education 10%  15%  75% 
Health 5%  25%  70% 
Total 30%  15%  55%   
Source: Qiu 2005    
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expenses for culture, education, science and health, that is, 399.76 billion yuan, followed 
by the investment of 190.65 billion yuan in capital construction.  
 
Table 6  Budgetary Expenditure of Central and Local Government by Item, 2003 
Unit: billion yuan 
Items Central  Local 
National Defense  188.53  
Armed Police Troops  24.00  
Social Security Subsidiary Expense  14.44   
Expenditure by Using the Vehicle Purchase Tax  46.52   
Interest Payment for the Foreign and Domestic Debts  95.52   
Capital Construction  152.28 190.65 
Enterprises Innovation Funds  4.21 63.43 
Science and Technology Funds  22.63  19.04 
Additional Appropriation for Enterprises' Circulating  1.06  0.14 
Geological Prospecting Expenses  2.56  8.14 
Operating Expenses of Dept of Industry, Transportation, and Commerce  8.45  20.07 
Supporting Agricultural Production and Agricultural Operating Expenses  13.56  99.93 
Operating Expenses for Culture, Education, Science and Health   50.79  399.76 
Pensions and Relief Funds for Social Welfare  0.51  49.37 
Government Administration  53.95 289.82 
Price Subsidies  23.75 37.98 
Urban Maintenances and Construction Expenditure    85.08 
Supporting Underdeveloped Areas    15.60 
Other Expenses  39.26 443.99 
Total  742.02 1723.00   
Source: Finance Yearbook of China 2004 
 
 
3) Intergovernmental Transfer System 
Improving the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system was another stated objective of the 
1994 fiscal reform, but progress in this area has been limited. In 1995, first formula-based 
equalization transfer was launched in China. However, after a decade of implementation, 
the equalization transfer has remained small (about 7.3 percent of the total central transfers 
in 2004) and majority of central transfers, in the format of tax rebate, have been negotiated 
with provinces, thus virtually preserving the pre-1994 pattern of interregional fiscal 
distribution. As a result, The current system of intergovernmental transfers in China is 
poorly designed to address the regional fiscal disparities and to support the financing of 
vital social services such as education and public health although the volume of central 
transfers is large, accounting for 46 and 48 percent of local expenditures in 2001 and 2002 
(World Bank. 2003, 70).    
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Chart 4 illustrates the structure of the central-local transfers in 2004. The largest 
central-provincial fiscal transfer was the revenue sharing transfers (469.5 billion yuan), 
followed by the tax rebate (404.97 billion yuan) and earmarked grants (322.33 billion). 
These three transfers combined accounted for more than 80 percent of the total central-
provincial transfers. The 2004 equalization transfer was 74.50 billion yuan, amounting to 5 
percent of the total central-provincial transfers.  
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Source: Ministry of Finance, China 
 
The Revenue Sharing Transfers 
Sub-national governments in China receive 25 percent of the proceeds of the value-added 
tax (VAT) and 40 percent of the enterprise income taxes and the personal income tax from 
the central government. Since the central government determines the tax base, tax rate, and 
collects VAT and most of income taxes, they are more suitably classified as general 
purpose transfers following the general convention in the public finance literature.  
 
Tax Rebate    
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With the 1994 tax reform, VAT and excise taxes were brought under central tax 
administration and a program of tax rebates were instituted for VAT and excise taxes in 
1994 which returned a fraction of these revenues to the province of origin. The provinces 
were assured that under centralized collection, each province would receive at the 
minimum the VAT and excise tax revenues it retained in 1993. For VAT and excise taxes, 
they have also been assured that their current rebates would total last year’s rebate plus 
30% of the growth in VAT and consumption tax revenues (Budget Committee 2002). 
Algebraically,    
  










t t t t
t t ET VAT
ET ET VAT VAT
TR TR  
Where: 
  TRt - tax rebate to a province at year t 
  VAT – value-added tax 
  ET – Excise taxes (Xiaofei Shui) 
  
In 2002, Personal Income Tax and Enterprise Income Tax were also brought under the 
central tax administration and a program of tax rebate similar to VAT tax rebate was 
instituted. Effective on January 1, 2002, all income taxes from enterprises
1 and personal 
income were shared by the central government and provincial governments at the ratio of 
50 to 50. Since 2003, the central share has been raised to 60 percent. To assure stability in 
provincial revenues, income tax rebate program to institute to ensure that all provinces 
received income tax revenues no less than what they received in 2001. 
 
Earmarked Grants 
The ad hoc transfers are categorized as “earmarked grants” by the Ministry of Finance. 
Various ad hoc transfers to finance various programs have grown over time in number and 
size. Currently there are about 200 programs accounting for more than 20 percent of total 
                                                 
1 The income tax from the following enterprises is excluded from the sharing policy: rail transportation, state 
post office, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, 
Construction Bank of China, State Development Bank, China Bank of Agricultural Development, Import and 
Export Bank of China, enterprises of offshore oil and national gas, China Petroleum and Natural Gas Co. 
Limited, and China Petroleum Chemical Co. Limited.     
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central transfers. These transfers are program-based and allocated for specific purposes 
such as subsidizing agricultural development, supporting infrastructure construction, 
assisting backward regions, and providing emergency funding for natural catastrophes. 
This transfer has risen to 322.3 billion yuan in 2004 (Shah and Shen 2006).  
 
 Grants for Increasing Wages of Civil Servants  
When the center raised the wage rate for public sector employees in 1999 and 2001, a 
special grant was established in 1999 to support the implementation of this policy in 
western and central regions. Thus the purpose of this transfer is to fill the fiscal gap caused 
by the central policy mandate. The wage rate was first increased by an amount of monthly 
120 yuan per capita on July 1, 1999, then further raised at a rate of monthly 100 yuan per 
capita on January 1, 2001, and on October 1, 2001, additional 80 yuan per capita per 
month was added. The wage increase was also accompanied by the construction of a bonus 
system for civil servants from 2001 (equivalent to an approximate increase of one month 
of wages) and by the establishment of a subsidy system for remote areas. More than 700 
counties were eligible to receive this grant. Besides, provinces faced with difficulties of 
paying teachers’ wages in rural elementary and middle schools are also compensated by 
this transfer (Zhang 2003). 
  The grant allocation can be characterized as: 
  i i i o ditureRati BasicExpen e ExpIncreas WageGrant * =   
Where 
  WageGrant – the grant for increasing wages received by province i 
ExpIncrease – the increase of provincial budgetary expenditure due to central 
policy of increasing wages 
BasicExpenditureRatio – the ratio of the personal and office expenses to the total 
disposable revenue of the province i 
According to the formula, the volume of the grant received by province i is dependent 
upon the provincial expenditure increase due to the wage policy and the share of basic 
expenditure (including personnel and office expenses) in the total disposable revenue of 
the province. The increased expenditure is determined by the number of civil servants in    
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province i and the standard of wage increase by the central government. The total transfer 
in 2004 amounted to 91.94 billion yuan (Shah and Shen 2006). 
 
Grants for Rural Tax Reform  
The transfer was created in 2000 to foster the implementation of the central policy to 
rescind “three village deductions and five township charges” (xiangtongchou he cun tiliu
 ) 
and gradually abolish agricultural taxes. The “three deductions” collected by villages are: 
collective investment, public welfare funds, and cadre compensation. The “five charges” 
include charges for rural education, family planning, militia training, rural road 
construction and maintenance, and subsidies to entitled groups levied by townships. This 
transfer is aimed at filling the fiscal gap caused by the rural tax reform. In 2004, the total of 
52.33 billion yuan was transferred to provincial governments.  
 
Grants for Minority Regions 
The grant for minority regions was established in 2000 in order to support economic 
development in minority regions which are usually backward in their economic 
performance. The total grant equals a base amount of 1 billion yuan in 2000 with a yearly 
growth rate equal to that of central VAT revenue, and the rebate of the 80 percent of the 
central increased VAT collection in minority areas. This transfer has risen to 7.69 billion 
yuan in 2004 (Shah and Shen 2006). 
 
Prio-1994 Subsidies 
Prio-1994 subsidies are the contracted fixed grants under the “Fiscal Contracting System” 
during the period 1988-1993. The total of the grant was both 12.6 billion yuan in 2003 and 
2004. Since 1994, local governments have continued to remit revenues to or receive 
transfers from the centre according to their fiscal contracts in effect in 1993. The amount of 
transfers is approximately equal to the estimated deficit (gap between revenue and 
expenditure) measured in the base year. Sixteen provinces, including Inner Mongolia, Jilin, 
Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shannxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, still receive this type of grant. 
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The Equalization Grant 
In 1995, the equalization grant, the first formula based transfer (the so-called transitory 
period grant until 2001) was established with a view to reducing regional fiscal disparities. 
The amount of the equalization transfer for a province i is determined by three factors: 
standard revenue of the province, standard expenditure of the province, and the share of the 








= *  
 
Where 
  i ET -- the equalization transfer for province i 
  TET – total equalization grant available in the budget year 
 SEi – standard expenditure of province i 
 SRi – standard revenue of province i 
  SE – total standard expenditure of the country 
SR – total standard revenue of the country  
  The size of the pool for the equalization transfer (TET) is determined by the central 
government on an ad-hoc basis, subject to annual funding availability.  
The standard revenues are equal to standard local own and shared taxes plus tax 
rebate plus various grants subtracted by remittances to the central government. In the 
formula, tax rebate, various grants, and remittances to the central government are actual 
amounts  paid by the central government. For each type of tax,  standard tax revenue is  
determined by multiplying the  standard tax base  with the standard tax rate. For personal 
income tax, the standard tax base includes salaries and income of private industrial and 
commercial enterprises. The actual income tax collection from other bases is regarded as 
the standard revenue. The income tax base of salaries is estimated using per capita taxable 
salaries net of exemptions and number of employees. The tax rate of salaries is local 
average effective tax rate, adjusted with a regional coefficient. The standard expenditures 
are measured as the total spending of seven sectors and for each sector the standard    
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spending cover personal expenditure (salaries and bonus) and office expenditures (vehicles, 
heating, and others).  
Although the equalization grant has been growing rapidly (2.07 billion yuan in 
1995 to 74.5 billion yuan in 2004), but by themselves cannot address public service 
delivery needs. At the lower end of the distribution, county and township governments in 
poor regions are unable to fulfill their expenditure responsibilities, and consequently 
provide insufficient levels of vital public services (Shah and Shen 2006).  
 
 
4. Local Government Financing: local taxes, intergovernmental transfers, 
and local borrowing 
 
During a seminar held by the Ministry of Finance and World Bank in Dali 2004, a local 
officer visualized the picture of local government financing with his words, “Center 
finances are booming; provincial finances are improving; prefectural finances are not bad; 
county finances are near-bankrupt; and township finances are basically bankrupt. Wong 
(2000) recorded a report from a Hunan official regarding wage arrears to civil servants, “it 
is normal for payroll to be a month behind. For payroll to be two months behind is habitual. 
If it is three months late it’s a little awkward. But it is not considered strange to be four 
months behind.”  
The 1994 tax assignment reform only dealt with revenue assignments, leaving the 
expenditure assignments intact. The process of recentralizing revenues upward and 
devolving expenditures downward has deteriorated fiscal vertical imbalance and imposed 
further fiscal stress on local governments, particularly those in the rural sector and in the 




1) Local Taxes 
Local taxes in China mainly comprise of Value-Added Tax, Business Tax, Enterprises’ 
Income Tax, Personal Income Tax, Tax on City Maintenance and Construction, Stamp Tax,    
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Tax on Real Estates,  Agricultural Tax, Contract Tax, Resource Tax, Tax on the 
Adjustments of the investment in the fixed assets, Tax on the Use of Urban Land, Land 
Value-Added Tax, Tax on the Use of Vehicles and Ships, Slaughter Tax, Banquet Tax, 
Tax on Special Agricultural Products, Tax on Animal Husbandry, Tax on the Occupancy 
of Cultivated Land, State-owned Assets Profit, Penalty and Confiscatory Income, Income 
from use of sea area, field, and diggings, Expert Project Income, and administrative fees,  
as well as other income.  
Table 7 provides main tax revenues of 31 provinces in 2003. Local finance is 
highly dependent on the shared taxes - Business Tax, VAT, Enterprise Income Tax, 
Personal Income Tax, and Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax, all of which are 
shared taxes with the central government. For instance, in 2003, Beijing obtained almost 
90 percent of revenue from the five shared taxes, or 51.88 million yuan out of the total 
59.25 billion; Chongqing’s 60 percent of government revenue was from the shared taxes. 
The Business Tax is the foremost important revenue source. The only exceptions are 
Shanxi, Heilongjiang, and Tibet, where revenue from VAT surpasses Business Tax. 
Thanks to the remarkable economic performance, wealthy regions, including Guangdong, 
Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, and Jiangxu, are also able to reap the benefits of economic 
development from enterprise and individual income tax. Revenue from local taxes is slim, 
totally 673.6 billion yuan in 2003 accounting for only about 30 percent of the entire local 
revenues.  
The regional divergence of government revenue is evident. Table 8 compares local 
revenues in Guangdong, Shanghai, Hebei, Shaani, and Tibet. Guangdong collected the 
largest income for each individual tax and for the total in 2003. In contrast to Guangdong’s 
total 131.55 billion yuan, Shanghai obtained 88.62 billion, the second in the nation; Hebei 
33.58 billion, the tenth out of the 31 provinces; Shaanxi 17.73 billion, the twentieth; and 
Tibet resided at the bottom with revenue of just 0.81 billion yuan.  
 
 
Table 7   Government Revenue by Province, 2003 
Unit: billion yuan 
 Total  VAT  BT  EIT  PIT  TCMC  RET  AT  CT  AF 
  Region Total         985.00  181.10  276.76 104.35 56.72 54.67 32.39 33.66  35.80  71.41   
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  Beijing         59.25  7.53  26.37 9.37 5.72 2.89 3.08 0.06  2.04  1.81
  Tianjin         20.45  4.52  6.43 2.38 1.25 1.08 0.72 0.04  0.83  1.47
  Hebei           33.58  6.87  6.54 2.87 1.81 1.88 0.90 2.50  0.60  2.94
  Shanxi          18.61  5.14  3.66 1.42 0.86 1.30 0.53 0.39  0.16  1.35
  Inner Mongolia  13.87  2.26  3.63 0.72 0.54 0.70 0.59 0.70  0.28  1.23
        
  Liaoning        44.70  8.55  11.91 3.59 2.36 2.58 2.07 0.72  1.57  3.79
  Jilin           15.40  3.07 3.50 1.18 0.78 0.93 0.64 1.02 0.49  1.50
  Heilongjiang    24.89  5.86  4.61 1.08 1.10 2.10 0.90 1.63  0.55  1.52
        
  Shanghai        88.62  17.02  33.23 14.62 7.18 3.56 2.24 0.01  6.35  2.28
  Jiangsu         79.81  18.14  20.72 9.27 4.02 4.63 2.32 2.66  4.03  5.08
  Zhejiang        70.66  15.50  22.01 10.65 4.58 4.22 1.73 0.54  4.78  2.03
  Anhui           22.07  3.70  4.60 1.90 0.82 1.33 0.60 2.67  0.71  2.30
  Fujian          30.47  5.44  8.47 3.68 2.13 1.39 1.31 0.12  1.15  2.14
  Jiangxi         16.82  2.31  4.32 0.97 0.73 0.82 0.35 1.57  0.69  1.82
  Shandong        71.38  12.61  14.47 6.64 2.60 4.44 2.45 4.24  1.53  7.57
        
  Henan           33.81  5.79  7.53 2.91 1.56 2.05 0.92 3.77  0.59  3.00
  Hubei           25.98  4.56  5.74 2.13 1.15 1.74 0.82 2.32  0.58  2.43
  Hunan           26.86  3.61  6.02 1.35 1.22 1.63 0.65 1.82  0.56  3.49
  Guangdong       131.55  23.37  41.58 17.00 9.48 4.77 4.56 0.80  4.85  8.77
  Guangxi         20.37  2.87  4.79 1.31 1.03 0.95 0.60 0.68  0.45  2.20
  Hainan          5.13  0.64  1.61 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.05  0.14  0.47
        
  Chongqing       16.16  2.47  4.66 0.88 0.79 0.87 0.42 0.62  0.42  2.59
  Sichuan  33.66  4.81  8.96 2.48 1.44 2.06 0.94 2.11  1.17  4.23
  Guizhou         12.46  1.94  3.15 0.84 0.54 0.87 0.37 0.52  0.18  1.17
  Yunnan          22.90  3.91  4.52 2.15 0.84 2.36 0.70 0.48  0.41  1.24
  Tibet           0.81  0.09  0.40 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.06
        
  Shaanxi         17.73  3.16  5.10 1.28 0.69 1.23 0.66 0.66  0.25  1.03
  Gansu           8.77  1.81  2.41 0.53 0.37 0.70 0.34 0.53  0.10  0.58
  Qinghai         2.40  0.53  0.73 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.05  0.03  0.12
  Ningxia         3.00  0.50  1.09 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.07  0.08  0.20
  Xinjiang        12.82  2.52  3.99 0.52 0.63 0.95 0.52 0.31  0.25  0.98  
1. VAT – Value-Added Tax; BT – Business Tax; EIT – Enterprises’ Income Tax; PIT - Personal Income Tax; TCMC – Tax on City 
Maintenance and Construction; RET – Tax on Real Estates; AT – Agricultural Tax; CT – Contract Tax; AF – Administrative Fees 
2. Other items of revenues not listed in the table: Resource Tax; Tax on the Adjustments of the investment in the fixed assets; Stamp 
Tax; Tax on the Use of Urban Land; Land Value-Added Tax; Tax on the Use of Vehicles and Ships; Slaughter Tax; Banquet Tax; Tax 
on Special Agricultural Products; Tax on Animal Husbandry; Tax on the Occupancy of Cultivated Land; State-owned Assets Profit; 
Penalty and Confiscatory Income; Income from use of sea area, field, and diggings; Expert Project Income; Other Income. 
3. Source: Statistical Yearbook of China (2004) 
Table 8  Provincial Revenue, 2003 
Unit: billion yuan 
Local Taxes  Guangdong 





(20/31)  Tibet  
(31/31)    
 
  28
VAT 23.37  17.02 6.87 3.16  0.09 
Business Tax  41.58  33.23 6.54 5.10  0.40 
Enterprise Income Tax  17.00  14.62 2.87 1.28  0.07 
Return for Enterprises’ Income Tax  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Personal Income Tax  9.48  7.18 1.81 0.69  0.03 
Tax on Resources  0.15  0.00 0.58 0.26  0.02 
Fixed Assets Investment Adjustment Tax  0.02  0.00 0.00 0.02  0.00 
Urban Maintenance and Construction Tax  4.77  3.56 1.88 1.23  0.03 
Tax on Real Estates  4.56  2.24 0.90 0.66  0.00 
Stamp Tax  1.41  1.32 0.23 0.13  0.00 
Urban Land Using Tax  0.59  0.23 0.39 0.26  0.00 
Land Value-added Tax  0.84  0.17 0.02 0.01  0.00 
Tax on the Use of Vehicles and Ships  0.66  0.12 0.08 0.05  0.00 
Slaughter Tax  0.07  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Banquet Tax  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Agricultural Tax  0.80  0.01 2.50 0.66  0.00 
Tax on the Special Agricultural Products  0.14 
0.00 0.08 0.42  0.00 
Tax on the Animal Husbandry  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Tax on the Use of Cultivated Land  0.66  0.32 0.19 0.14  0.00 
Contract Tax  4.85  6.35 0.60 0.25  0.00 
State-owned Asset Profit  2.08  0.00 0.38 0.90  0.01 
Planning Subsidies to the Loss-suffered 
SOEs 
-0.29 
-3.62 -0.16 -0.13  -0.09 
Administrative Fees  8.77  2.28 2.94 1.03  0.06 
Penalty and Confiscatory Income  4.48  1.41 2.60 0.75  0.03 






Expert Project Income  3.35  1.98 1.67 0.68  0.03 
Other Income  2.08  0.20 0.58 0.19  0.13 
Total 131.55  88.62 33.58 17.73  0.81   
*This is the ranking of provincial tax revenues 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China (2004) 
 
2) Intergovernmental Transfers 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers between different tiers of the government system have 
assumed an important role in China’s fiscal reform: China’s central government 
increasingly relies on intergovernmental grants to promote nationwide fiscal equalization 
and poverty reduction; and local governments are highly dependent upon the grants to 
fulfill their basic spending needs. For instance, in 2002, the overall grant funding received 
by county level governments exceeded 39 percent of these local governments’ total 
budgetary revenue and 43 percent of their budgetary expenditure (Yao 2005a, 3).  
  Chart 5 depicts the distribution of per capita central transfers by province in 2004. 
For the total central transfers, Shanghai, the richest province, was the highest per capita 
recipient province (5,079 yuan) and Henan the lowest (646 yuan) with the national average    
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of 1117 yuan per capita. Table 9 breaks down provincial per capita central transfers into 
major categories. When it comes to revenue sharing transfers, Shanghai obtained the 
national highest per capita transfers of 2,830 yuan; Hainan received the lowest within the 
eastern region (179 yuan); Shanxi and Xinjiang were the highest recipients in the central 
and western regions respectively; and Tibet received the lowest in the western China and 
also in the nation. As for the tax rebate, Shanghai, Jilin, and Yunnan received the largest 
amount in the eastern, central, and western China respectively. For obvious reasons, the six 
coastal provinces – Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang did not 
receive any equalization transfers. Tibet received the highest per capita equalization 
transfer of 705 yuan (Shah and Shen 2006).  
 

















































































The total central transfers also include revenue sharing transfers that are 25% of VAT and 40% of Personal and Enterprise Income 
Taxes in each province.  
Source: Shah and Shen 2006.    
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Table 9   A Regional Perspective on China’s Central Transfers (2004) 
Unit: per capita yuan 
  Nation-wide Eastern  PRC Central PRC  Western PRC 




















                   






























































                   



















(Tibet)  366 



















(Tibet)  1075   
Source: Shah and Shen 2006.    
 
  31
3) Local Borrowing 
Under China’s 1994 budget law, local governments are forbidden to incur either domestic 
or foreign indebtedness unless otherwise permitted by law. However, the reality is many 
local governments are on the verge of bankruptcy due to debt services. It is estimated that 
the total local borrowing was over US$120 billions by the end of 2004 (Wei 2004). The 
total debt of the grassroots governments was around US$ 40 billions by the end of 2001, 
over half of which was borrowed by townships. According to the Audit report to the 
national congress in June 2002, the total debt for 49 counties (cities) audited was about 
US$ 8 billions, about 2.1 times of the yearly disposable fiscal resources. The total debts 
should be much higher if the implicit debts such as the unpaid civil servants salaries and 
farmers' services were included. Local borrowing can be roughly categorized as follows: 
 
Direct Borrowing and Loan Guarantee 
It is illegal but in practice the law and regulations of local borrowing were widely violated 
by local governments. Almost all local governments of different levels in China incurred 
direct borrowing and the actual borrowing could be from any department of a local 
government.  
  Another form of borrowing is debt to the government employees, mainly teachers 
of elementary and secondary school, and venders providing products or services to 
governments. Local governments (particularly the county and township governments) in 
dire fiscal straits are unable to pay the full salaries of elementary and secondary school 
teachers and the unpaid part becomes the local debt. On some occasions, grassroots 
governments issue informal debt papers (baitiao) to farmers when they are financially 
incapable to pay farmers for their agriculture products.  
Meanwhile, almost all local governments provide loan guarantees for SOEs directly 
or indirectly, although it is neither allowed by the budget law. Local governments also 
provide loan guarantees to the central bank for local financial institutions to avoid financial 
risk.  
 
Borrowing from Commercial Banks    
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As banks have been transformed into financial institutions, local governments posed 
prevailing impact on the administration of bank lending through the appointment of 
regional bank heads, and also through intangible influences such as the supply of water and 
electricity, housing, recruitment of bank employees, and schooling of children (Huang 
1996). Therefore, local government gained substantial control over the credit supply and 
emboldened overlending and underpricing of loans, which led to the excessive expansion 
of banks’ credit and a mounting number of bad and non-performing loans. Ultimately the 
borrowers of nonperforming loans may default, requiring the lender to absorb the loss. In 
1998, the central government had to bail out local government by issuing 270 billion yuan 
of government bonds to recapitalize the state-owned banks (Jin and Zou 2003, 308) 
 
Indirect Borrowing  
Sub-national governments take on indirect borrowing through various channels such as 
local-owned enterprises or Trust and Investment Companies (TICs).   
Local enterprises, in charge of providing public services, can and do borrow from 
banks and on the capital market. Given the local finance stress and insufficient financial 
support from the upper levels, such local borrowing essentially finances much sub-national 
spending. This in turn created contingent liabilities for local governments. Local 
governments may also borrow through "collective financing" in which various groups of 
people, such as government employees and employees of local SOEs, are selected to be 
borrow from by local governments. The borrowing could be voluntary, but most of time it 
was forced by local governments. Most of these borrowings were used to start local 
enterprises. However, a significant part of these projects were not successful and the 
bankruptcy of these enterprises due to lack of management skills and experiences imposed 
serious debts to local governments. Local authorities also maintain considerable latitude in 
securing and deploying financial resources for investment projects. For instance, sub-
national governments are allowed to approve investment projects below 50 million yuan 
and technology promotion projects below 30 million. These projects can be funded by 
commercial and indirect borrowing, which resulted in redundant of sub-national medium- 
and small-sized investment projects (Jin and Zou 2003).      
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  Another channel for local indirect borrowing is establishing dummy financial 
companies, which has fueled the proliferation of Trust and Investment Companies (TICs) 
and securities hourses at subnational levels. TICs receive government and enterprise trust 
deposits or trusted deposits. Most TICs were created by the four state-owned specialized 
banks, and some by other banks, the MOF, or municipalities. In the late 1980s, as many as 
365 TICs were in business across the country (Mehran, et al. 1996).  
 
Foreign Borrowing 
External borrowing by the central and local government-owned financial institutions has 
been managed by a credit management system, under which the issuance of debt requires a 
quota from the SDPC and an approval from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). Most of these local financial institutions are TICs controlled by local governments 
and those TICs engaged in international business are referred to as International Trust and 
Investment Companies (ITICs). Since the borrowing by these entities are not guaranteed 
by any direct or indirect credit support from the central government and hence the central 
government refused to bail out ITICs, Guangdong ITIC went bankrupt in 1999 as well as 
Fujian ITIC, Tianjin ITIC, Shanghai ITIC, Daian ITIC, Shandong ITIC, and Shenzhen 
ITIC. By the end of 1998, the external debt of domestic financial institutions (including 
central agencies) was $41.99 billion, 28.8 percent of China’s total external debt. It is a 
question whether the central government has to step in once financial failure emerge on a 
large scale among these ITICs (Jin and Zou 2003, 313). 
 
Although practiced informally or illegally, local borrowing played an important role in 
local economic development and in alleviating local fiscal pressure, particularly for those 
localities struggling to make ends meet. The significant improvement of local 
infrastructure in almost all jurisdictions in the last decade is partially attributed to local 
borrowing. However, illegal local borrowing usually operated behind the screen, is 
difficult to control and susceptible to corruption, which seriously damages local 
governments’ accountability.  
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5. Fiscal Power Shifting through Decentralization 
China’s decentralization is featured by the devolution of fiscal power during the period of 
contracting system (1979-1993) and the recentralization of fiscal power under the current 
tax sharing system (1994-present).  
 
1) 1979 – 1993: Fiscal Power Devolution 
In 1980, China implemented the policy of fenzhaochifan (“eating in different kitchens”), 
aiming to separate the central and local budgets. Budgetary contracts between the central 
and local governments were established which often varied by regions and were subject to 
renegotiations when circumstances changed. During the process of fiscal decentralization, 
local governments developed power and their relationships with local enterprises 
strengthened. 
  Under the 1980-93 fiscal contract system, local governments, as agents of the 
central government, had strong incentives to reduce the revenue transfer to the center and 
heighten the need for transfers from the center as net local net income was to be transferred 
to the central government and shortfalls were to be covered automatically. The “Fiscal 
Contracting System”, established in 1988, also created a strong incentive for local 
governments to conceal information about local revenues from the center as this 
information would be valuable when the fiscal contracts were negotiated. During this time, 
many of the new townships and village enterprises were joint ventures with local 
government ownership; local enterprises and local governments colluded to hide profits 
from taxation and shift deficits to the center with retained profits accruing to the benefit of 
“local shareholders”. Thus the system heightened an asymmetry, in that local governments 
absorbed excess revenues, while deficits were covered by the center (Ahmad 2002). 
Further, although local governments did not have the authority to alter the statutory tax 
rates and bases, they literally controlled the effective rates and bases by offering varying 
degrees of tax concessions to enterprises and shifting budgetary funds to extra-budgetary 
funds. 
The waning central fiscal control and distorted local incentives prompted a 
conspicuous falling trend of central revenues and a significant reduction in fiscal revenue 
collection as a percentage of GDP. The ratio of total government revenue to GDP declined    
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from 28.4 percent to about 12.6 percent over the period 1979-1993; the central 
government’s share of the total revenue reduced from 40.5 percent to 22 percent over the 
period 1984-1993.  
In the face of the plummeting fiscal revenue, the center had to resort to various ad 
hoc instruments, including arbitrarily shifting expenditure responsibilities to local 
governments, cutting intergovernmental transfers, forcing local governments to purchase 
bonds at lower-than-market rates, and recentralizing locally-owned enterprises, to 
influence revenue remittances from local governments (Ma and Norregaard 1998).  
However, these instruments only created a vicious cycle of perverse reactions from 
the local governments as the center was opt to revise the rules of the game to penalize local 
governments with fast growing revenues. Local governments, with distrust on the center 
and also increasing pressure to meet new spending responsibilities, began collecting a wide 
variety of extra-budgetary revenues, and even levying illegal fees and charges for 
providing basic public services when the fiscal needs were beyond the revenue capacity. 
Meanwhile, the weakening fiscal power at the center increased government deficits and 
reduced the central government’s flexibility in using fiscal policy in stabilization and 
redistribution. 
 
2) 1994-present: Predatory Fiscal Federalism 
 
The 1994 Tax Sharing Reform 
was a turning point - the central 
government strengthened its fiscal 
power through capturing core 
taxes and establishing central tax 
administration. Indeed, since 1994, 
the central government has rapidly 
centralized the most lucrative 
sources of revenue, including 
value-added tax, resource tax, and 
personal and corporate income tax.  In the case of the VAT, the four layers of local 
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government—provincial, prefectural/city, county, and township—together share only 25% 
of VAT intake.  In 2002, the central government further ordered local governments to give 
50% of personal and enterprise income tax over to the central government. As chart 6 
reveals, local revenue as a share of total government revenue dropped rapidly after the 
1994 tax centralization while the local expenditure as a share of total government 
expenditure lingered around 70 percent.  
The process of recentralizing revenues upward and devolving expenditures 
downward extends from the central to the provincial to the prefectural to the county and 
ultimately to the township and village level. Each level pushes fiscal responsibilities down 
to lower levels while asserting the largest possible claim on revenue residuals.  At the 
grassroots levels—the county and township levels-- local governments are left no choice 
but either predate on local residents, enterprises, and financial institutions or simply not 
provide the primary public services.   
 Politically, the increasing fiscal dependence of county governments on higher 
levels may lead to greater political dependence. The fiscal system today is even more 
capable of reinforcing the central mandates and hence more vulnerable to punitive 
measures from the center (Wedeman 1999;Yang 2004). The central government is also 
attempting to inject more earmarked funds directly to the county level (Wong 2005), which 
further enhances the organizational integration of grass-roots government with the center. 
Central edicts may carry more weight than it would have under the old fiscal system, 
which is confirmed by the observation of the rapid local response to the center’s action on 
the SARS scare (Liu and Shih 2004).  
In the wake of stronger central power in the midst of fiscal decentralization, some 
researchers have offered their explanation: in China, fiscal decentralization in the context 
of political authoritarianism creates a unique version of distorted federalism, which is 
named “predatory fiscal federalism” by some researchers (Shih, et al. 2004;Yao and Yang 
2003;Zhang 2003;Zhu and Ye 2001). Due to a hierarchical party structure and the absence 
of national elections, the central and provincial governments bear enormous leverage over 
grassroots governments – the higher tiers of government devolve fiscal responsibilities 
down to the lowest levels of government and meanwhile the most productive sources of    
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revenue are captured by the top tiers of government
2. Plus fiscal responsibilities at various 
levels are not defined in the constitution and therefore left to the manipulation of higher 
tiers of governments. Bureaucrats at all level manage to maximize revenue in order to 
build up administrative performance (zhengji). For instance, infrastructure construction is a 
main way to present government performance, which indeed led to rampant redundant 
investment in many places. In this fiscal structure, Shih et al. (2004) argued that the central 
government’s only incentive to transfer money downward is the fear of widespread social 
stability or the complete collapse of grassroots governments.  
 
6. Effects of Fiscal Decentralization on Macroeconomic Performance  
The conventional wisdom favors decentralization as a way to improve the efficiency of the 
public sector and thus promote economic growth (Bird, 1993; Bird and Wallich 1993; Bahl 
and Linn 1992; Gramlich 1993; Oates 1993, 1972; and World Bank1990, 1992) because 
local governments are better positioned than the national government to deliver public 
services that match local preferences and needs. Many proposals favor assigning more 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities to local governments. The question of whether 
fiscal decentralization has contributed to China’s economic success over the past 25 years 
is still open to debate. Table 10 provides an overview of various studies conducted on this 
subject.  
Table 10  China: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth 
Literature Time  Period  Conclusion 
Qi (1992)   positive 
Qian and Weingast (1997)  1980-1993  Promoted economic development 
Yang (1997)    Negatively affected economic growth 
Ma (1997)   positive 
Zhang and Zou (1998)  1980-1992 negative 
Qian (1999)  1980-1993  Promoted local economies 
Young (2000)    Negatively affected economic growth 
Lin and Liu (2000)  70-93 positive 
Jin and Zou (2005)  1979 - 1999  Divergence in revenue and expenditure at the sub-national level is 
associated with higher rates of growth. 
Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005)  1970-1999 positive 
 
Some scholars argue that fiscal decentralization has been conducive to China’s 
economic development. Qi (1992) and Qian (1999) suggested that the fiscal contract 
                                                 
2 This form of fiscal arrangement is still considered federal because local governments do not merely serve 
as agents to implement standardized central policies; they have considerable discretion to enact specific 
policies and they have to pay for the provision of most public goods.      
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system (1980-1993) provided material incentives that stimulated sub-national governments 
to promote local economies. Qian and Weingast (1997) argued that the fiscal contract 
system enabled sub-national governments to avoid revenue predation from the center and 
therefore retain financial resources for investments that promoted economic growth. Lin 
and Liu (2000) have found that fiscal decentralization is one of the key driving forces
3 of 
China’s remarkable economic performance via improvement in efficiency rather than 
increases in investment. Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005) suggested that fiscal 
decentralization reforms considerably strengthened the fiscal incentives of provincial 
governments which are generally conducive to provincial economic development and 
reform. 
Some studies have, however, offered evidence suggesting that fiscal 
decentralization is detrimental to China’s economic growth. Yang (1997) and Young (2000) 
offered evidence suggesting that fiscal decentralization fragmented the national market, 
encouraged local protectionism, induced duplicate investments, and hence negatively 
affected economic development. Zhang and Zou (1998) provided supportive evidence 
demonstrating that the share of central government development spending has a positive 
impact on economic growth while the share of provincial government development 
spending is negatively related to growth.  Using data across 28 Chinese provinces over the 
period of 1980—1992, they have found a significant and negative relationship between the 
degree of fiscal decentralization and provincial economic growth. Another concern is that 
the aggressive decentralization has crowded out public spending on national priorities by 
local public projects. Some public infrastructures crucial to economic growth are better 
provided by the central government, such as high ways, railways, telecommunication, and 
power. The inefficient resource allocation induced by the fast fiscal decentralization is 
detrimental to the overall economic performance. Jin and Zou  (2005) empirically 
approved that divergence, rather than convergence, in revenue and expenditures at the sub-
national level of government is associated with higher rates of growth. 
7. Political as well as Economic Issues arising after Decentralization 
 
1) Decentralization and Inequality 
                                                 
3 Other driving forces include rural reform, the nonstate sector, and capital accumulation.    
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It is widely believed that fiscal decentralization has exacerbated regional inequality in 
China. One is that, fiscal decentralization, combined with distorted price systems and 
duplicated industry structures across regions, led to inter-regional trade protection and 
fragmented domestic markets as a consequence of local governments’ rent-seeking 
behaviors (World Bank. 2003;Young 2000). Qiu, et al. (2003) developed a theoretical 
model to reveal that fiscal decentralization and international trade protection together give 
rise to inter-regional trade protection which can widen the regional gap in China. On the 
other hand, fiscal expenditure decentralization reform that hardens the budget constraints 
for grass-root levels of government undermines the revenue-starved jurisdictions’ ability to 
provide public goods and services, aggravate the lower level governments’ fiscal burden, 
and prevent them from pursing further economic investment and development, which 
ultimately leads to the regional income and fiscal gaps (Jin and Zou 2003;Park, et al. 
1996;Yao 2005b). Kanbur and Zhang (2001) examined the time series of regional 
inequality measured by the GE coefficient over the period of 1952—1999.  They have 
found that decentralization had a significant and positive effect on the degree of regional 
inequality; and it has especially enlarged the rural-urban inequality though it reduced the 
coastal-inland inequality. To shed more light on this issue, further empirical analyses are 
needed using more refined measures of decentralization and more disaggregated data.  
China's decentralized fiscal system has not coped well with the problem of 
mushrooming inequality. The consensus among observers of China is that both the 
willingness and capability of the government to cope with inequality have weakened. In 
the pre-reform period, the fiscal system was highly redistributive. For instance, over the 
period 1978-1980, Shanghai turned over half of its provincial GDP while the poor 
provinces received large subsidies as large as 20-25 percent of their GDP. The fiscal 
decentralization between 1979 and 1994 had greatly reduced the scale of inter-regional 
redistribution as a result of the localization of public finance and remarkable decline in 
inter-governmental transfers. For example, in 1993, Shanghai only submitted only about 
8.5 percent of its GDP, and other rich provinces turned over even less. The net remittance 
of Guangdong, was only 0.4 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, subsidies to poor regions cut 
down sharply (Wang and Hu 1999). However, the mild redistributive feature through the 
1993 fiscal system was essentially eliminated by the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform. The taxes    
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were reassigned, with the center capturing the most lucrative taxes, and the transfer of “tax 
rebate” was introduced, favoring the rich regions as the leverage to buy in those affluent 
provinces.  
Moreover, even other discretionary transfers, including earmarked grants and 
equalization grants, are not targeted to poorer provinces. Instead, the fiscal transfer system 
is used to maintain the loyalty of local officials and key constituents (Liu and Shih 2004, 
20-21).  Wang (2001) attempted to explore the underlying logic of intergovernmental 
transfers in China and has found that that maintaining national unity is an overriding 
concern for Chinese political elites -provinces with predominantly non-Han population 
have been given the highest levels of subsidies, even though their income levels exceed 
those of the poorer provinces. Wong (2000) suggested that the overall impact of inter-
governmental transfers is disequalizing—net of all effects, inter-governmental transfers 
tend to favor more developed provinces. Liu and Shih (2004) also confirmed that  the post-
1994 fiscal system has exacerbated the divergence in county-level fiscal balance after 
fiscal transfers are taken into account. Tsui (2005) conducted an analysis on the impact of 
the intergovernmental transfers on fiscal disparities at the county-level. Not surprisingly, 
the tax rebate is the conspicuous source of dis-equalizing, contributing more than 21 
percent of fiscal disparities in 2000. The TPG, designed supposedly for fiscal equalization, 
actually increases fiscal inequality. Yao (2005a) uses a comprehensive dataset for 2755 
counties and applied a single-threshold linear-spline model to evaluate the most recent 
grant policies. The study reveals a significant equalizing effect of grants to the rural low-
revenue-capacity counties yet a significant counter-equalization effect to urban high-
revenue-capacity counties. For the majority of counties, the effects of equalizing and 
disequalizing grant policies sum up to zero (Yao 2005a, 28). 
 
 
2) Proliferation of Off-Budgetary Resources 
Besieged by pressing fiscal needs but constrained financial resources, local governments 
have vigorously pursued extra-budgetary funds. Local governments are also faced with 
growing spending needs, particularly the financing of social safety nets and infrastructure 
investment. Some localities have to take over the uncompensated transfers of social    
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expenditures from SOEs, including housing, childcare, medical care, education, and 
pension debts. In spite of overwhelming fiscal needs, local governments in China literally 
have no tax autonomy: the center set tax rates and the bases of collection. Plus the central 
government, knowing the stress on local budgets, tolerated and often encouraged local 
governments to seek “self-reliant” solutions. The channel open to local governments for 
revenue expansion is to develop extra-budgetary
4 and off-budget
5 resources, in the form of 
fees and charges, over which the local officials have complete control and face virtually no 
oversight (World Bank. 2002). While no official figures are available, some estimates 
suggest that the number of extra-budgetary funds and off-budgetary funds may be as large 
as 1,000. Some scholar estimated that the size of extra-budgetary and off-budgetary 
revenues is similar to the level of budgetary resources, accounting for 11-12 percent of 
GDP (Ma and Norregaard 1998, 2).  
The 1994 tax-assignment reform did little to discipline the opaque and regressive 
extra-budgetary funds. Local governments and line departments continue to use extra-
budgetary and off-budgetary funds as a way to avoid central government (or other higher 
level government) restriction on the use of these funds. With almost half of the public 
sector revenue wandering outside the budgetary system, the non-budgetary financing at the 
macro-level undermines fiscal discipline, hampers efficient resource allocation, and gives 
rise to wasteful spending and corruption. The unruly system of extra- and off-budget 
finance further impoverishes life of poor farmers by levying myriad fees and charges for 
basic public services. Such “unauthorized” use of revenues poses substantial challenges to 
the national fiscal discipline, economic reforms, and political stability; it has made poor 
farmers in the less-developed regions more miserable. 
Prior to 1994, budget deficits were financed by a combination of credits from the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) and domestic and international borrowing. The new budget 
law (effective January 1, 1995) stipulates budgets at all levels of government shall be 
                                                 
4 Extra-budgetary revenues are obtained by government units using coercive power but are not included in 
the formal budget system. They include various surcharges and service fees charged by government agencies. 
In theory, extra-budgetary revenues are collected based on regulations promulgated by the central or 
provincial level governments. 
5 Off-budget revenues are collected by government units, particularly, township and village level 
governments, without the authorization from the central or provincial level governments.    
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balanced and that any violation of the balanced budget would result in administrative 
prosecution against parties directly responsible (Jin and Zou 2003, 301). 
Faced with tight budgetary constraints as a result of low level of formal taxations 
and skyrocketing pending needs generated by local development and public services 
delivery, the lower authorities usually cannot meet their budgets by formal taxation alone 
and thus have to pursue “informal” channels aggressively - diverting resources from the 
budget to extra-budgetary channels, protecting local enterprises, and imposing an array of 
arbitrary fees making schooling and medical care too costly for poor households. Local 
governments at the present time lack discretion to change the rates or define the base of 
local taxes or to decide whether or not to adopt taxes from the list of taxes assigned to 
them. The growth of illegal fees, the main source of extra-budgetary funds at the local 
level, now may be as much as 20 percent of GDP, two thirds of which accrue to sub-
national Governments. The list of fees ranges from surcharges on household utility 
bills/road maintenance/vehicle purchases to hospitals and school charges (World Bank. 
2002, 62). The Ministry of Finance found in 1996 that in a Hebei county 71.5 per cent came 
from all kinds of fees while only 28.5 per cent from formal taxes (Bernstein and Lu 2003). 
The proliferation of "illegal" fees at the local level has become a matter of concern 
regarding the distortionary effects on the overall fairness of the system: The farmers in the 
poor western provinces have to pay for compulsory education from their own pocket and 
their family members seriously ill basically wait for death.  
 
3) Deficient and Unequal Public Services Delivery 
To achieve efficient services delivery, countries and national states must institute an 
effective division of labor among multi-levels of government and assign appropriate 
financing instruments (fiscal revenues) to match fiscal responsibilities. China’s highly 
decentralized system could be a boon to managing service delivery, but under the current 
arrangements, grassroots governments have inadequate revenues for meeting their heavy 
expenditure responsibilities and receive little help from the system of intergovernmental 
transfers. As a result, some local authorities truly lack the capability to deliver basic public 
services, no matter how much they tax the local population (Shih, et al. 2004;Zhou 
2003;Zhu and Ye 2001)    
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Core public services like education and public health, which are usually seen as 
responsibilities shared by central and sub-national governments due to their important 
spillover effects for the society as a whole, are assigned to local governments in China. As 
of 2004, 63 percent of overall government expenditure responsibilities was about equally 
distributed among the provincial, prefecture and county levels of government, and 
townships accounted for 7 percent. It is critical to mention that rural governments at the 
county and township levels, treated the same as urban governments in the Chinese fiscal 
system, are responsible for daily government administration, providing core social services, 
and investments in infrastructure. As a result of revenue recentralization and responsibility 
devolution in the past two decades, rural governments are relatively bankrupt leaving many 
basic public services unfunded. Chart 7 illustrates the widening vertical fiscal gap during 
the process of fiscal decentralization. Many local governments, especially those in poor 
western regions, are providing fewer and lower quality public services and passing along a 
higher proportion of the costs to their constituents. 
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There is also substantial evidence of great regional and local inequalities in the 
delivery of basic services. No mechanisms exist to ensure minimum service standards 
across regions. As regional disparity in income grew, this has led to growing regional 
disparities in services through the 1990s and a default in the delivery of vital services in 
many poor localities (West 1999;World Bank. 2005, 22). Table 11 summaries provincial 
per capita budgetary expenditure on education, health, and social security in 2003. Despite 
the fact that Guangdong spent per capita 3064.29 yuan on education, Liaoning only 
allocated 97.49 yuan and Tibet 15.06 yuan per person. When it comes to health spending, 
Chongqing and Shanghai resided as the top two (771.43 yuan and 652.33 yuan per    
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individual), compared to on 23.09 yuan in Anhui, 12.2 in Ningxia, 6.09 yuan in Tiebt, and 
5.89 yuan in Hainan. As for expenditure on social safety net, the regional variation is 
strikingly large: the highest spending resided in Chongqing, Hunan, and Qinghai 
(respectively 5064.29 yuan, 1436.29 yuan, and 1011.11 yuan) whereas the lowest was only 
79.09 yuan in Guangxi, 45.8 yuan in Ningxia, 21.63 yuan in Hainan, and 8.51 yuan in 
Tibet.  
 
Table 11   Regional Per Capita Budgetary Expenditure on Education, Health, and Social Security 
(2003)                                                                                                                                                 nit: yuan 
  Operation Exp of Education  Public Health  Social Security* 
  Beijing         678.57  340.66  477.34 
  Tianjin         470.82  151.34  341.25 
  Hebei           175.95  51.41  163.39 
  Shanxi          462.91  139.42  593.41 
  Inner Mongolia  538.08  169.14  649.85 
  Liaoning        97.49  24.99  195.18 
  Jilin           225.63  67.65  396.64 
  Heilongjiang    222.07  63.25  267.52 
  Shanghai        2354.84  652.33  980.29 
  Jiangsu         662.35  205.62  358.36 
  Zhejiang        297.14  82.16  85.78 
  Anhui           114.23  23.09  138.00 
  Fujian          198.72  44.23  97.22 
  Jiangxi         100.62  23.56  107.64 
  Shandong        513.47  113.53  306.77 
  Henan           308.42  70.99  301.83 
  Hubei           106.03  28.80  116.15 
  Hunan           1247.92  232.69  1436.29 
  Guangdong       169.25  46.91  96.50 
  Guangxi         118.72  31.52  79.09 
  Hainan          18.94  5.89  21.63 
  Chongqing       3064.29  771.43  5064.29 
  Sichuan  224.21  64.65  258.80 
  Guizhou         741.06  213.32  387.18 
  Yunnan          297.76  104.47  334.82 
  Tibet           15.06  6.09  8.51 
  Shaanxi         171.32  43.15  199.48 
  Gansu           108.78  26.97  143.74 
  Qinghai         466.67  196.30  1011.11 
  Ningxia         37.40  12.20  45.80 
  Xinjiang        203.61  69.92  243.18   
*Expenditure for Social Security comprises three parts: expenditure for pension and relief funds for social welfare, expenditure for 
retired persons in administrative department, and expenditure on subsidies to social security programs. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 2004 
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Chart 8 compares per capita education and health expenditure by counties in 1993 
and 2000. It is shocking to find out that counties in seven provinces literally spent less on 
education and health in 2000 than 1993. Particularly, Hainan spent 18.2 yuan less, Inner 
Mongolia 13.7 yuan less, and Jilin 7.6 yuan less. In the meantime, county expenses on 
education and health in Beijing and Shanghai was increased by 137.9 yuan and 109.5 yuan 
respectively.  
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Source: adapted from Liu and Shih 2004. 
The comprehensive county-level fiscal data is from the Statistical Material for Prefectures, Cities, and Counties Nationwide 
(Quanguo Dishixian Caizheng Tongji Ziliao). 
 
However, the central government does send billions in transfer payments to 
provincial and grassroots governments each year in the fear of the collapse of rural public 
good provision and wide-spread instability. The question for then becomes the efficiency 
rather than the amount of grants. At the top of the government hierarchy, except the 
Premier and the Secretary General of the CCP, one or two voting members in the ruling 
Standing Committee of Politburo
6 would be removed from office if wide-spread instability 
broke out in a region or if public services totally collapsed. Thus the General Secretary and 
the Premier require provincial officials to cap taxes and to provide essential public goods 
in case of the disturbance. Likewise, provincial leaders command prefecture and county 
officials to make the commitment. However, officials at all levels realize that the 
                                                 
6 The total number of members of the Standing Committee of Politburo is roughly 12.     
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requirement is only meant to prevent the worst scenarios from occurring. Therefore, 
despite the huge amount of resources transferred from the center, the revenue predation at 
higher tiers of government remains and grassroots governments simply struggle to get their 
ends meet (Shih, et al. 2004, 6-9).   
 
4) Farmers’ Burden and Rural Unrest 
The farmer burden has landed at the center of the political debate as complaints, petitions, 
and even violent unrest are spreading as a consequence of grassroots governments passing 
their financial stress to local residents through indirect borrowing, heavier taxation and 
informal fees (Li 2001;Ren 2002;Tao, et al. 2005).  Since the banking reform of 1998 
when the power to appoint bank managers was removed from local authorities, taxation 
and informal charges became the few means of fulfilling their fiscal obligations (Bernstein 
and Lu 2003).  
Throughout the reform-era, the center has launched several campaigns to limit the 
administrative fees collected by grassroots governments. These reforms culminated to the 
recent tax-for-fees (feigaishui) reform in March 2000, which attempted to remove all local 
informal charges and lift the rates of formal agricultural taxes. Then a provincial pilot 
program of rural taxation reform in Anhui was initiated, but very soon the local budgets in 
Anhui were under great financial strain due to significant reduction of revenues. 
Complaints from local officials were accumulating; in some districts of Anhui, taxation 
rate surged up again and after a short-term reduction, local fees re-emerged (Ren 2002). In 
2002, the rural taxation reform in 20 provinces across China was carried out, accompanied 
by a central transfer of RMB 25 billion and provincial transfers of about the same amount. 
However, the issue of peasant burden and the risk of rural unrest are still haunting 
the regime. Tao, et al. (2005) argued that the burden problem lies in the intrinsic nature of 
the Chinese predatory fiscal federalism. The authoritarian regime is able to embolden 
insufficiently funded state mandates in the countryside; in the meantime, the decentralized 
system impeded the government to monitor the behavior of local cadres who can impose 
charges on farmers in the name of implementing these central government mandates. Their 
empirical analysis, based upon field interviews in 2003-2004 and a panel data set across 8 
provinces from 1986-2002, revealed that the increase of rural income disparity and the    
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uneven tax and fee distribution among different income groups explained the increasingly 
severe rural taxation after 1990s.  
 
8. Conclusion and Policy Options 
Given the objective of improving local public services and promoting economic growth, 
the present system of fiscal decentralization may not be sustainable in the long run. The 
way forward will almost certainly embrace a significant modification and reforms of the 
existing intergovernmental fiscal system. We explore a few general policy options for 
China in this concluding section. 
 
 
(1) Set up formal and stable expenditure assignment to clarify the responsibilities of 
governments  
China has made dramatic progress in separating government from SOEs and re-defining 
the function and responsibility of government in the economy in last two decades with the 
economic reform and fiscal decentralization, but there are still many problems from the 
expenditure assignment perspective. In particular, a stable and transparent expenditure 
assignment with less concurrent responsibilities is in need. It has significant meaning in 
China’s political framework because (a) it will significantly improve the accountabilities of 
both the central and local governments; (b) it can effectively prohibit government from 
encroaching private sectors; and (c) sound expenditure assignment is also a key component 
to solve the horizontal fiscal disparities as the expenditure follows with proper fiscal 
revenue.  
It is necessary to stress that local government should focus on the public services 
and social affairs while the central government has the expenditure responsibilities on such 
national issues as national defense, foreign affairs, economic development, and improving 
regional equality besides the public services and social affairs. This is the prerequisite for 
building the sound system of expenditure assignment. The central government should 
implement macroeconomic policies such as monetary policy, fiscal policy, exchange rate 
etc, and create a harmony macroeconomic atmosphere and environment for the stable and 
healthy development of society and economy. The local governments are mainly in charge 
of managing social affairs, organizing and delivering public services. Apparently, local    
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governments need to switch the focus from economic construction to public services 
gradually.  
It is important to build broad and formal coordinating institutions to deal with 
concurrent assignment. The responsibilities should be defined for a multi-dimensional 
array of attributes, including: (i) actually producing a good or delivering a service, (ii) 
providing or administering the service, (iii) financing a service, and (iv) setting standards, 
regulations, and policies guiding the provision of government services.  While there is no 
problem, with assigning competencies over these attributes in the case of exclusive 
assignments, there is a need to be explicit about their assignment in the case of concurrent 
expenditure assignments.  
 
(2) Align the decentralized fiscal system properly to guarantee all citizens have access 
to basic public service  
First, it is necessary to start to build national minimal standard of basic public services. 
The wide and increasing regional disparity in China could be harmful for the cohesive of 
the country. A national minimal standard of public services can play significant role in 
improve national cohesive. Basic public services should cover nine years compulsory 
education, basic hygiene medical treatment, basic unemployment compensation and 
endowment insurance and essential communal facilities services in rural public services. 
Second, it should be the central government’s responsibility to guarantee all 
citizens have access to basic public service. Although equalization transfer can be regarded 
as an important approach to address the issue of regional disparity, it should be more 
important in China to through setting national minimal standard and centralizing basic 
public services. Most of governments at and under county level cannot provide adequately 
basic public services, such as education, health care and social security net. Meanwhile, the 
provision of basic public services by the governments at and under county level also 
causes the equity problem. With wide economic disparity across provinces, it is also not a 
good choice to assign the responsibility to provincial governments.  
 
(3) Provide sound local autonomy to improve local fiscal capacity    
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International experience suggests that local governments are more efficient and effective in 
implementing their responsibilities when they are also responsible for raising the revenues 
that they spend. In most federal and unitary but decentralized countries, decentralization 
reaches local governments quite fully, with these entities having different degrees of 
revenue autonomy and exclusive responsibility for an array of functions and services. This 
status for local governments is the result of explicit legislation in unitary decentralized 
countries. The most important issue in China is how to balance the legislative revenue 
autonomy and the administrative revenue autonomy. Apparently there is no such a political 
mechanism to prevent the local government from practicing wide administrative revenue 
autonomy or abuse legislations. Improve current system to provide local government 
reasonable tax autonomy and formalize the administrative autonomy is one of the most 
important tasks.  
First, the revenue autonomy should be built based on the right balance between 
devolution of responsibilities according to economies of scale, the internalization of costs, 
and available administrative capacity. There is no consensus on the degree of autonomy 
that should be devolved to local governments. However, most federal systems provide 
local governments with their own sources of revenue, with autonomy to change at the 
margin, tax rates or other elements of the structure of the tax. A tentative list of the most 
widely used local taxes across countries would include property taxes, user charges, 
business license fees, permits and excise taxes, motor vehicle taxation, income taxes, and 
sales taxes.  
Second, an asymmetric approach can be explored as a means to allow major cities 
and other local governments with more developed capacity to introduce piggyback income 
taxes and other forms of local tax autonomy. Greater revenue autonomy must be 
considered an important reform in putting decentralization to work at the local level in any 
decentralized country. Most sub-national governments need to augment their revenues due 
to the large share of committed expenditures and increasing needs. This can be 
accomplished in a number of ways, including increasing own source revenues, improved 
tax administration, and increasing intergovernmental transfers. Enhancing the revenue 
autonomy of sub-national governments would have the added advantage of tightening the    
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Wicksellian link between costs and benefits which would help foster greater fiscal 
discipline.  
Third, it is necessary to increase the share rates of local part in major taxes such as 
VAT and income taxes to improve the fiscal capacity of local government. The framework 
of current tax sharing system is consistent with international good practice in revenue 
assignment since multiple uses of the same base, if properly coordinated, is found to 
simplify administration and reduce compliance costs. However, China’s tax sharing system 
has showed significant differences. The major difference is that the tax rates are 
determined by the central government, and local governments do not have autonomy to 
alter rate. The advantage is that it may eliminate the horizontal tax competitions, but the 
disadvantage is that uniform arrangement of tax sharing cannot fit all jurisdictions. 
Fourth, it is necessary to continue to reform tax system. The main objective is that 
governments at each level should have a stable tax base and main taxes, either exclusively 
or shared with other governments. Good property tax for governments at and under county 
level should be a reasonable approach. It not only provides a main fiscal resource for richer 
jurisdictions, but also simplified currently over-complicated local tax system. Technically, 
current VAT and enterprise income tax have serious problem. Production type VAT 
generates distortion to market, and the enterprise income tax based on ownership further 
enlarge the distortion. In addition, the problem of tax mobility across province has not 
been seriously recognized in China. Current revenue assignment is not able to deal with the 
increasing tax competition.  
 
(4) Formalize local borrowing system to support sustainable development 
 First, decentralize the authority of local borrowing to jurisdictions with reasonable fiscal 
capacity. International experience suggests that local borrowing has the potential to 
generate significant benefits for local governments by allowing them to finance public 
capital projects. Current budget law prohibited local governments from borrowing. 
However, it did not effectively prevent local government from informal borrowing, and 
caused various issues. In future reforms, first, it is necessary to consider to permit local 
borrowing. Second, set strict central control on local borrowing. Currently, China’s bond 
market is not well developed, and therefore, the municipal bond market should not be    
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regarded as the main approach of local borrowing although it is necessary to start to build 
the system. 
 
(5) Standardize intergovernmental transfer to meet the goals of governments 
Generally speaking, intergovernmental fiscal transfers are used to correct for vertical and 
horizontal imbalances, inter-jurisdictional spillovers, and promote national objectives. All 
countries use special purpose grants of one type or another to promote national priorities 
and address inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Equalization grants and special purpose 
transfers also help reduce vertical imbalances or the mismatch between expenditure 
responsibilities and own sources of revenues for sub-national governments. Often different 
forms of revenue sharing, in themselves a type of transfer, are used to address vertical 
imbalances. However, the only fail proof way to address vertical imbalances is to provide 
sub-national governments with an adequate level of revenue autonomy. In summary, a 
system of transfers is needed for many good reasons, but it can easily be misused, and 
transfers are not a substitute for a healthy degree of tax autonomy.  
  First, central transfer should focus on national minimal standard of public services 
and provincial transfer should focus on equity of local service provision. Current revenue 
assignment cannot guarantee all citizens have access to basic public services. On other 
hand, requiring sub-national governments to rely too heavily on own revenues to close 
vertical imbalances may give rise to economically and/or politically unacceptable 
differences in the quality and quantity of critical social and economic services among 
jurisdictions. Although in practice countries differ in how, and if, they use measures of 
expenditure needs and/or fiscal capacity in their equalization formulae, a well-designed 
equalization grant is often used in many countries to reduce horizontal fiscal disparities 
among sub-national governments arising from differences in expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity. The intergovernmental transfer should be designed to focus on national minimal 
standard of public services. 
The design of transfers is of critical importance for efficiency and equity of local 
service provision, revenues autonomy, and fiscal health of local governments. In China, 
one of the priorities in public finance is to allow all citizens to have access to basic public 
services. Consequently, intergovernmental transfer for both decreasing the regional    
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disparity and solving the vertical fiscal imbalance should be based on national minimal 
standard of public services.  
  Second, it is necessary to improve the transparency of transfers. To achieve the 
goal of transparency, a couple of measures should be in the agenda.  
  (a). it is very important to build an intergovernmental transfer system to make sure 
the predictability of local budget. The formula-driven intergovernmental transfer is the key 
in the design of future reform in intergovernmental transfer to match current budget law. It 
also helps to align the behavior of governments and improve governments’ accountabilities.  
  (b). capital transfers should address externalities across local governments, assist 
with financing constraints for lumpy capital, ameliorate significantly different 
infrastructure endowments when these are not the result of voluntary decisions, and pursue 
sectoral objectives. Two major policy biases need to be openly addressed. First, the belief 
by some central authorities that capital expenditures are always more efficient than 
recurrent expenditures and second, the lack of maintenance of existing infrastructure. 
Conditional matching grant arrangements can help sub-national governments to take 
ownership and more properly maintain infrastructure. Capital grants vary by the degree of 
flexibility in the use of the funds. They can either be specific project-based grants, which 
tend to be closely administered and monitored by line ministries, and categorical or block 
grants. Capital grants also vary by the way funds are allocated. The approaches include ad 
hoc decisions and negotiations, use of a pre-established formula, and competition 
processes with defined application procedures. There is no single best approach to the 
design of capital transfers, but non-transparent, highly detailed, and discretionary 
procedures should be avoided. Formulas based on needs and clients are often quite feasible. 
In Australia, for example, funding for school buildings based on the number of students is 
available. Although a few countries use a loan and grant combination for the 
implementation of capital grants, the vast majority of countries just use a grant formula 
often accompanied by matching arrangements. Matching arrangements can raise some 
liquidity problems for low income sub-national governments, but the matching rate can 
also be adjusted for fiscal capacity. 
(c). it is necessary to formalize conditional grants. The centrally sponsored schemes 
are an important source of revenue for local governments in China, and they are justified    
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on the same bases as conditional grants are in other countries: addressing externalities, 
pursuing national objectives, and so on. It is generally recognized, however, that there are 
too many schemes in China. There, the trend has been in the opposite direction of the 
international trend, with a continued growth in the number of schemes. In fact, the schemes 
provide a backdoor for the federal government to micro-manage decisions that are 
ostensibly the responsibility of the states, and burden the administrative capacity of the 
states, reduce their budgetary autonomy, and distort state decision-making and priorities. 
Furthermore, these schemes blur the lines of responsibility. 
Conditional grants can be block grants for health, social services, and other areas, 
while categorical grants require states to apply them to particular narrower areas of 
expenditure. These categorical grants act as central mandates on the provincial receiving 
the central assistance. The criteria of distribution include measures of need of the 
community, capacity of providing services, cost of providing services, and tax effort. The 
formulas can be very simple or very complicated, but they are generally related to 
population and per capita income.  
In summary, transfers to local governments should be clear, transparent, and 
formula based. The methodologies should be simple and use available measures, such as 
population and property taxation. With time, as data on reliable developmental indicators 
are compiled, transfers could also be related to other proxies of revenue capacity and 
expenditure need. Given the types of services that are provided at the local level (i.e., water 
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